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Abstract 
This study analyses the impact of changing systems of finance on the performance of 
hospitals in Portugal, specifically in terms of costs per admission and per patient day, average 
length of stay and the number of admissions.  The study is based on panel data (36 hospitals 
over a ten-year period), used to estimate cost functions.  It is concluded that costs per 
admission decreased over the period in question, principally due to declining length of stay. 
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1. Introduction 
The rising costs of health care have been a source of concern for governments in all 
industrialised countries.  In Portugal throughout the 1970s, the proportion of gross domestic 
product devoted to health care more than doubled [OECD, 2000 #16].  This rapid growth 
prompted an interest in the possibilities offered by alternative forms of financing hospital 
services and, as a consequence, the financial environment of Portuguese hospitals became the 
subject of reform.  In 1981, hospital finance moved away from the earlier system of direct 
reimbursement, based on pre-determined schedules and costs incurred, towards prospective 
payment, entailing the implementation of hospital budgets based on hospital output (average 
cost by specialty and individual services provided).  In 1990, a new process of allocating the 
budgets, based on a less heterogeneous measure of output, was gradually introduced.  In 
essence, this was a diagnosis-related-group (DRG) system, of the form pioneered in private 
health care systems, such as that of the USA.  This development was defended on the 
grounds both of leading to a more equitable distribution of funds across providers and of 
improving the efficiency of the public sector hospitals, where a lack of incentives for 
resource-saving had been recognized.  
 Although the DRG reform was criticised on the grounds of ineffectiveness and 
inadequacy [Costa, 1994 #1], there was relatively little empirical analysis at the time to 
inform a judgement [Paiva, 1992 #3; Dismuke, 1994 #2].  This paper undertakes a 
retrospective evaluation of the Portuguese financial initiatives. 
 
2. Portuguese hospital finance 
Until the end of the 1970s, hospitals providing care were reimbursed from a variety of 
funding sources.  These included patients or their families and the counties, for care provided 
to the poor.  For hospital care provided to patients under social security schemes, the central 
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government reimbursed on a per diem basis, according to pre-determined schedules.  The 
principal funding source, however, remained the public health care budget.  Since hospitals 
were at liberty to determine the number of patient days and the services provided, there 
appeared to be little incentive to improve efficiency.  Except for care funded by the social 
security scheme, hospitals were paid according to the costs they incurred. 
 In 1981, a new financing structure was implemented [Ministério da Saúde, 1985 #4].  
Hospital prices (in effect, fees for service) were defined according to the average costs of two 
different groups of hospitals (Central and District).  Within each group, prices were based on 
the average cost of each medical speciality, adjusted for average length of stay and 
occupancy rate, variations being permitted within pre-determined limits.  Outpatient 
consultations, emergency admissions and ancillary services were reimbursed according to 
prices set annually, again on the basis of average costs.  Average in the first two of the above 
was based on the number of patients attending, whilst ancillary services were costed on the 
basis of number of clinical procedures performed.  The hospitals’ “hotel” services were 
similarly priced on the basis of average costs and reimbursed by number of inpatient days per 
case.  Using the above criteria and based on past activity levels, annual prospective hospital 
budgets were elaborated, although a secondary financial budget was also established to take 
account unplanned breaking of constraints in the initial budgets [Mantas, 1989 #5]. 
 Whilst it appeared to exert a positive impact on the number of hospital admissions, 
length of stay and occupancy rates, this budget allocation process still appeared less than 
satisfactory [Ministério da Saúde, 1989 #6]. Basing reimbursement on costs by medical 
speciality enabled a high degree of heterogeneity to remain in the financial structure.  No 
rewards for efficiency were built in to the funding model; indeed, funding the ancillary 
services by fee-for-service induced over-consumption and the substitution of more expensive 
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for cheaper diagnostic tests.  Over time, the 1981 reform led to significant differences in the 
cost of treating individual cases across Portuguese hospitals. 
 In consequence, a second reform was introduced from 1990.  This new scheme used 
an homogeneous measure of hospital output, based on DRGs.  Under this system, patients 
were to be classified, according to diagnosis, into one of 477 DRG categories.  Classification 
is based on multiple characteristics, for example, the anatomical system affected, whether 
surgery was performed, the principal diagnosis, the age of the patient, secondary conditions 
prevalent and discharge status.  In theory, cases within in each diagnostic category will have 
similar hospital lengths of stay and similar intensities of resource consumption.  By 
implication, the treatment costs for all patients within each group will be similar.  Under the 
DRG reimbursement mechanism, therefore, prices are set for the entire inpatient episode and 
not individually for each input used during the episode (e.g., bed days, pharmaceuticals, and 
X-rays). 
 Implementing a DRG-based financing model requires that every case be assigned to a 
specific DRG and reimbursed on the basis of an average cost computed for the whole health 
care system.  In reality, however, implementation cannot ignore the structural consequences 
of the earlier models of financing.  Prior to 1990, significant differences in treatment costs 
amongst Portuguese hospitals had emerged.  A rapid application of the DRG model would 
have had a considerable impact, in that some hospitals would have experienced large and 
sudden decreases in funding, while others would have experienced abrupt increases.  It was 
established that the move to DRG financing would have to be protracted and, each year, 
hospital appropriations would embody a decreasing component of payment based on 
hospital-specific costs.  In the first year, this proportion would be 90 per cent, with only 10 
per cent of the resources allocated for inpatient care on the basis of national average cost.  
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 It is worth commenting that, since the publication of the DRG plan, the financing of 
hospitals has not been the subject of open debate.  The Central Financing Department has 
operated with a degree of secrecy and it is accordingly difficult to make reasoned judgements 
about the course of the reform and its future.  Possibly political reasons explain the lack of 
dissemination of financial information concerning the funding of hospitals.  To the best of 
our knowledge, only data enabling the comparison of lengths of stay in each DRG between 
hospitals has been formally published.  Even so, an increasing part of hospital revenue has 
been regulated directly by DRG schedules since 1990.  
The majority of empirical studies of the impact of rate-setting legislation on hospital 
costs were conducted in the USA, contemporaneously with the introduction of DRGs in that 
country.  These typically used the state or the county as the unit of analysis and found that 
replacing retrospective payment systems with prospective ones was effective in restraining 
costs and utilisation [Melnick, 1981 #7; Coelen, 1981 #8; Rosko, 1984 #9; Rosko, 1987 #10].  
Our study attempts a similar analysis in the Portuguese context, with a slight modification.  
In the Portuguese case, it is clearly the pre-1980 financing model which is the closest 
approximation to retrospective payment, whereas the two schemes of the 1980s and 1990s 
are both variants of prospective payment.  As data prior to 1985 are unavailable, it proved 
impossible to compare the pre-1980 period with the following two periods of reform.  Our 
study thus analyses hospital performance over the period 1985-1994 and compares the two 
prospective payment periods, before and after the introduction of DRGs.  
 
3. Analysis 
Our analysis of the impact of prospective payment on hospital performance relied on the 
general model: 
Pit = α + βXit + γDt + δHi+ εit 
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where i = 1,…,36 denotes the thirty six individual hospitals and  t = 1,…,10 denotes annual 
time periods.  Pit is the measure of performance of the ith hospital during the tth year and Xit a 
vector of control variables representing demand and supply factors.  Dt a vector of dummy 
variables for years and Hi a vector of dummy variables for the hospitals.  As conventionally, 
εit  is the error term, α the model intercept, and β, γ, and δ vectors of estimated parameters.  A 
linear functional form was used in the estimation of separate regression models for four 
different measures of hospital performance – cost per case, cost per patient day, average 
length of stay and number of admissions. 
 To properly identify the specific impact of the financing system on hospital 
performance, several control variables were included in the model.  Thus, the estimated 
coefficients of variables such as population age, local income and local infant mortality 
capture the impact of demographic and economic characteristics, as well as the health status, 
of the population resident in the district in which each of the hospitals is operating.  The 
coefficients of size, input prices and staff levels estimate the effect of hospital characteristics 
on unit costs, length of stay and cases treated.  The coefficients of the hospital binary 
variables measure the impact of omitted, hospital specific variables, which are assumed 
invariant over time.  In turn, the regression coefficients of the year binary variables measure 
the effects of changes in the payment system, assumed to exert a constant effect across 
hospitals.  
 The observational unit for our analysis was thus the individual hospital.  The data set 
consisted of a pooled sample of cross-section and time series observations covering 36 acute 
district hospitals, for 10 years (1985-1994), a total of 360 observations.  The primary data 
source was the Ministry of Health’s hospital statistics.  These annual surveys provide patient 
numbers, number of hospital beds, hospital expenditures, personnel and cost estimates for 
outpatient and emergency visits.  Data for the demand variables and price indices were 
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obtained from annual surveys published by the Instituto Nacional de Estatística.  A listing of 
the variables used in the analysis appears as an Appendix to this paper. 
 As noted above, our analysis comprises four regression models, with cost, output and 
utilisation as dependent variables.  Two proxies - the ratio of total hospital inpatient 
expenditures (adjusted by the public expenditure deflator) to the number of patients admitted 
yearly and number of patient days - measure the two cost- determining variables.  Capital 
expenditures were subtracted from total hospital expenditures, as capital goods are financed 
independently of the recurrent budget. Other items subtracted from the total were 
expenditures on medicines prescribed during outpatient consultations (which were paid by 
the Regional Health Authorities pre-1990) and costs on outpatient and emergency visits.  
Both cost per case and cost per day are reported, because it was conjectured that the two 
payment systems under consideration (speciality and DRG) might have different effects on 
specific cost components.  Were both payment systems to affect primarily the length of stay, 
a substantial impact would be expected on cost per case and a negligible or even opposite 
effect on cost per day. 
Exogenous variables in all regressions included four demand variables, describing 
factors that mirror need for health care, the inducement of consumer demand by health care 
professionals and the ability to pay for health care.  Portuguese public hospitals are obliged to 
treat all patients in their area of referral and the four variables thus capture the impact of 
health, demographic and economic characteristics of the population living in the district 
where the hospital is located.  The proportion of district population aged 65 years and over 
(POP>65) reflects the significance of population groups who tend both to consume a 
disproportionate amount of health care and to be admitted to hospital more often.  USA 
studies reported patient age to be a significant determinant of hospital costs and utilisation 
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[Melnick, 1981 #7; Sloan, 1980 #11] and we therefore hypothesised a positive regression 
coefficient for this variable in all four regressions. 
The standardised mortality rate - a commonly-used proxy for population health status 
and need for care - has been shown to be positively related to the standardised hospital 
episode ratio [Estelle, 1994 #12].  However, as the variability of district infant mortality was 
larger than that of standardised mortality, we have adopted the former variable (IMRate) in 
our model.  Again, a positive coefficient of this variable would be predicted for every model 
estimated.  The number of inhabitants per general practitioner (POPGP) was included as a 
measure of the impact on the demand for inpatient care induced by the number of GPs in the 
district.  In other studies, the number of active physicians per capita has been found to be 
positively related to hospital expenditures per inpatient day and per admission [Coelen, 1981 
#8].  Positive elasticities between the number of physicians per capita and total costs, and 
between the former and the number of admissions per capita, have been reported [Ashby, 
1984 #13].  The purchasing power index (PPIndex) is a measure of the income for the 
average consumer in each district and thus proxies the ability to pay for health care.  We 
hypothesised that this variable might have a positive impact on unit costs, as well as on 
admissions and utilisation.  
 Four independent variables are included to control for the impact of hospital 
characteristics on performance.  Hospital size was measured as the total number of inpatient 
beds (BEDS).  USA evidence suggests that larger hospitals are more likely to attract a 
complex case mix and to have higher unit costs [Pauly, 1970 #14; Rosko, 1984 #9].  Thus, 
this variable should have a positive coefficient.  The unit cost of labour (LPrice) and of 
supplies (OPrice) were included to account for possible differences in input prices across 
hospitals.  Hospital spending, and hence unit costs, is expected to rise with each of these two 
variables, although their impact on admissions and length of stay seems unpredictable.  
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Hospital personnel per available bed (STAFF) is a crude measure of the intensity of services 
provided by the hospital.  Therefore, this variable should be positively related to unit costs, 
admissions and length of stay, as has been discovered before [Rosko, 1984 #9].  Ideally, case-
mix and managerial skill differences require controlling in the analysis.  As case-mix data 
were unavailable, binary dummy variables for each hospital were used to isolate the impact 
of otherwise-unmeasured hospital-specific characteristics. 
  
4. Results 
A two-way fixed effects regression analysis was undertaken for each of the four 
specifications of performance.  Thereafter, the estimation of the degree of cost-containment 
was undertaken for three separate cost measures (total, labour and overheads), on a per 
admission and per diem basis.  The results for total cost equations are displayed in Table 1. 
 The impact of prospective payment on hospital performance is captured by the 
coefficients for the individual year dummy variables.  Specifically in relation to the costs per 
admission, the results suggest that, after accounting for the effect of other explanatory 
variables, the deviations of the time dummy coefficients from the base year (1985) range 
from 8 contos in 1986 to 212 contos in 1994.  The costs per patient day are around 2 contos 
lower in 1986 and 20 contos in 1994.  With regards to the number of admissions, there is a 
positive trend throughout the period, whilst length of stay steadily declined.  In the unit cost 
and length of stay equations, the estimated coefficients of the control variables have the 
expected sign.  The coefficients in the admission equation, however, appear perverse in this 
respect, for example, the negative sign associated with population age. 
Based on the Table 1 results, Table 2 displays the annual and cumulative savings in 
cost per case and cost per day for both specialty-based and DRG financing periods. The DRG 
cumulative effect is estimated from the difference between the coefficient for the last year 
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before the implementation of DRGs (1989) and the coefficient for 1994. The specialties 
cumulative effect is obtained from the difference between 1986 and 1989. In both cases, the 
level of statistical significance of the estimated cost savings was assessed using a t-test at the 
conventional statistical levels.  The results for individual year estimates follow a similar 
pattern for both cost per case and cost per day, with 1989 (the year before the implementation 
of the DRG scheme) being associated with the highest cost-saving effect. 
 The cumulative savings expressed as a percentage of average costs during the two 
schemes are presented in Table 3.  It is evident that the negative effect on both components of 
total inpatient unit costs during the specialty scheme is quite different in terms of magnitude.  
Labour expenditures are twice as large on a per admission basis and relatively higher on a per 
patient day basis. However, the contribution of other overhead expenditures to the total 
inpatient estimated savings is larger than labour expenditures when both cumulative savings, 
as a percentage of average costs in 1989, are compared.  The reasons for these divergent 
patterns are not clear.  It is possible that the smaller percentage attributed to the labour costs 
could be associated with changes in the structure of professional careers at the time.  Under 
the DRG scheme, the contribution of labour to cost containment was about eight times higher 
than other overhead expenditures.  However, the results suggest that the contribution of 
labour to total inpatient estimated savings is now higher than overhead expenditures, when 
the cumulative savings, as a percentage of average unit costs in 1994, are compared.  The 
lower contribution of other expenditures to cumulative cost savings in percentage terms could 
be explained by the fact that hospitals began contracting privately for catering, cleaning, 
security, hotel and other services.  Under both schemes, cost per day declined less than did 
cost per admission.  As hospitals were remunerated and budgets allocated per patient 
admitted, it seems plausible to argue that the incentive effect to reduce costs per admission 
was operating. 
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Table 4 displays estimated changes in length of stay and admissions attributed to both 
payment schemes.  With regard to the average length of stay, only in 1994 does there appear 
to be an increase, although this effect is not significant.  Once again, 1989 seems to have 
experienced the greatest annual reduction. This result helps to explain the significant yearly 
cost savings already found for this year.  Table 5 displays the cumulative changes in both the 
number of patients admitted in the hospital and in the average length of stay, expressed as a 
percentage of the average levels of these variables in 1989 and 1994.  The impact on the 
number of admissions during the specialty scheme period is more than twice as large as 
during the DRG scheme.  The impact on the length of stay appears to be similar under both 
schemes, possibly because there will be technical constraints to length-of-stay reductions 
independent of systems of finance. 
 
5. Discussion 
Our results suggest that significant cost reduction occurred over the period of analysis, 
achieved by the reduction in the average length of stay.  As a result of shorter stays in 
hospital, there were opportunities to increase admissions.  The evidence that the number of 
hospital admissions rose also suggests that the occupancy rate increased, given stability in the 
stock of beds.  This finding would support an increase in the efficiency in the provision of 
care, in that there is an opportunity to distribute fixed costs across more patients.  The 
significant cumulative cost reductions per inpatient day suggests either that district hospitals 
were treating less complex, and hence less costly, cases or that they are treating the same 
cases with less resources (i.e. more efficiently).  Given the evidence that hospitals were 
reducing length of stay, costs per day would be expected to increase, unless there had been 
significant declines either in the provision of labour and ancillary services and/or in input 
prices.   
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 During the specialty period, overhead expenditures emerged as the main determinant 
of cost savings.  Under the DRG scheme, however, it was the labour component fulfilling this 
role, suggesting that hospitals were substituting expenditures on services contracted privately 
for labour.  Regarding the cumulative changes in admissions and length of inpatient stay, it 
was found that, under the specialty period, the number of admissions was higher and the 
average length of stay slightly lower, in percentage terms, than under the DRG period. 
 
6. Conclusion 
As noted at the outset, with health care expenditures rising at a rapid pace in Portugal, several 
attempts have been made to reform the health care system.  The hospital sector, consuming 
around fifty-two percent of public funds, has been subject to changes in the process of 
allocating the public health budget.  This study represents the first attempt to analyse the 
impact of changing systems of finance on the performance of hospitals in Portugal. 
 Our analysis reveals that significant cost reduction occurred over the 10 years’ (1985-
1994) period of study, achieved by the reduction in the average length of stay.  The empirical 
results also suggest that Portuguese district hospitals have been providing hospital services 
more efficiently, in that higher occupancy rates mean opportunity to distribute fixed costs 
across more patients and that decreasing costs per day the possibility of treating the same 
cases with less resources. 
 This study also concluded that, unlike the specialty scheme period, under the DRG 
scheme the main component contributing to cost savings was labour, suggesting that 
hospitals were substituting expenditures on services contracted privately for labour. 
The above findings have implications for the evaluation of the DRG system as a 
budget setting tool and as a payment mechanism in Portugal.  Lately, the Ministry of Health, 
to keep pace with the need of extra health care funds, is questioning the financing criteria 
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adopted.  However, it is particularly pertinent to note that the DRG system was not yet 
adopted in full and, despite the schedule fixed by the Ministry of Health, in 1999 only 30 
percent of the budget was allocated according to the DRG pricing scheme.  Therefore, a 
longer time period and larger percentages of payment based on DRGs are needed to infer 
whether changes in hospital financing will actually reduce hospital costs without adversely 
affecting quality of care, access to hospital care and patient health status. 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
Variable Definition Mean SD
Dependents  
Cost per case Ratio of total inpatient expense (net of capital expenditures 
and ambulatory expenditures) to admissions, expressed in 
1991 constant contos. 
 
165.4 48.9
Cost per day Ratio of total inpatient expense to patient days, expressed 
in 1991 constant contos. 
 
20.6 6.1
ALOS Ratio of total inpatient days to admissions 
 
8.1 1.5
CASES Total admissions to the hospital 
 
8052.1 3688.5
Demand  
POPGP Number of inhabitants per GP, in the district where the 
hospital is located 
 
1454.0 225.2
POP>65 Population aged 65 and over, in district where the hospital 
is located (%) 
 
14.8 3.8
IMRate Infant mortality rate, in the district where the hospital is 
located (%) 
 
12.0 4.2
PPIndex Purchasing power index, in the district where the hospital 
is located 
 
63.7 20.8
Supply  
BEDS Total inpatient beds 
 
244.6 112.8
Oprice Overhead expenditure per day 
 
1202.2 1095.5
Lprice Ratio of expenditures on labour to number of personal 
 
1787.9 752.6
STAFF Ratio of number of personnel to beds 
 
2.3 0.8
Dummy  
YR85,...,YR94 Binary variable, =1 in year indicated 
 
Hosp02,...Hosp36 Binary variables, =1 for hospital indicated 
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Table 1 – Two-way fixed effects regression model results 
 
Independent 
variable 
Cost per 
admission 
Cost per patient 
day 
Average length of 
stay 
Admissions 
POPGP -0.0171** -0.00131 -0.00081 0.08174 
     
POP>65 7.7926*** 0.60104* 0.1972** -251.49*** 
     
IMRate 0.07457 0.0204 -0.001777 -3.4715 
     
PPIndex -0.3504 -0.0807 0.0226 12.496*** 
     
BEDS 0.16632*** -0.00391 0.05621*** 8.2006 
     
Oprice 0.01131*** 0.00299*** -0.000347*** 1.0113*** 
     
Lprice 0.0665*** 0.00743*** -0.000616* -0.50267 
     
STAFF 54.444*** 6.272*** 0.3047** -145.42 
     
YR86 -8.264 -0.67026 -0.28854 182.67 
     
YR87 -23.694*** -1.5175* -0.77631*** 536.55*** 
     
YR88 -57.975*** -4.8375*** -1.1822*** 998.83*** 
     
YR89 -100.82*** -8.8460*** -1.9468*** 1 542.4*** 
     
YR90 -124.59*** -11.697*** -2.1651*** 1 669.7*** 
     
YR91 -161.31*** -14.742*** -2.9116*** 1 705.7*** 
     
YR92 -180.73*** -16.844*** -3.3263*** 2 388.7*** 
     
YR93 -210.45*** -19.583*** -3.6815*** 2 756*** 
     
YR94 -212.10*** -19.957*** -3.6776*** 2 376*** 
     
Lag.Mult. test 224.6 178.3 491.9 537.9 
Hausman test 0.0001 0.0001 0.0 0.0 
R2 0.76 0.79 0.76 0.95 
Note: Models with pooled data for 36 hospitals, over the period 1985-1994. Hospital dummies not 
shown.*** Significant at the 1% level    **Significant at the 5% level * Significant at the 10% level  
(two-tailed test) 
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Table 2 - Estimated savings attributed to the prospective payment schemes for inpatient cost 
per admission and inpatient cost per day (1991 constant escudos) 
 
 Year Cost per case (contos) Cost per day (contos) 
 1987 -15.429** -0.847 
    
 1988 -34.263*** -3.32*** 
    
 1989 -42.863*** -4.008*** 
    
 1990 -23.77*** -2.851*** 
    
 1991 -36.72*** -3.045*** 
    
 1992 -19.42*** -2.102*** 
    
 1993 -29.72*** -2.739*** 
    
 1994 -1.65 -0.37 
    
Cumulative Savings    
Specialty scheme 
 
 92.55*** -8.175*** 
DRG scheme  -111.28*** -11.111*** 
 
Note: *** Significant at the 1% level  **Significant at the 5% level * Significant at the 10% level  
(two-tailed test) 
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Table 3 - Cumulative cost savings attributable to financing schemes 
 
Cumulative cost 
effect
Cost level at 
end of period 
(b)
Cumulative effect 
as a percentage of 
end-year cost level
Speciality scheme (1985-1989) 
 
Total inpatient costs 
 
-251 174 c  (a)
Total inpatient costs per admission 
 
-100.82 c 143.66 c 70.17
     Labour inpatient costs per admission
 
-56.26 c 125.5 c 44.91
     Other inpatient costs per admission 
 
-28.58 c 37.93 c 75.34
Total inpatient costs per patient day  
 
-8.84 c 17.93 c 49.30
     Labour inpatient costs per patient 
day 
  
-3.77 c 15.76 c 23.92
     Other inpatient costs per patient day -2.5 c 4.74 c 52.74
DGR scheme (1989-1994) 
 
Total inpatient costs 
 
-622 593 c (a)
Total inpatient costs per admission 
 
-100.28 c 175.16 c 63.53
     Labour inpatient costs per admission
 
-83.13 c 130.43 c 63.73
     Other inpatient costs per admission 
 
-10.56 c 76.54 c 13.79
Total inpatient costs per patient day  
 
-11.11 c 25.24 c 44.01
     Labour inpatient costs per patient 
day 
  
-7.59 c 18.84 c 40.28
     Other inpatient costs per patient day -0.22 c 11.02 c 1.99
 
Note: (a) This figure represents the cumulative cost saving of total inpatient costs obtained 
from the dummy coefficients of the two-way fixed effects model, run for total 
inpatient costs. 
          (b) Figures in this column are unit costs computed for the sample mean in end-period 
year. 
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Table 4 - Estimated changes in average length of stay and number of admissions attributed to 
the DRG scheme 
 
 Year Average length of stay (days) Admissions
 1987 -0.4875*** 353.88* 
    
 1988 -0.4061** 462.28** 
    
 1989 -0.7646*** 543.57*** 
    
 1990 -0.2183 127.3 
    
 1991 -0.7465*** 36 
    
 1992 -0.4147** 683*** 
    
 1993 -0.3552** 367.3*** 
    
 1994 0.0039 -380*** 
    
Cumulative Savings   
Specialty scheme 
 
-1.6582*** 1 359*** 
DRG scheme -1.7308*** 833.6 
 
Note: *** Significant at the 1% level    **Significant at the 5% level * Significant at the 10% 
level  (two-tailed test) 
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Table 5 - Cumulative changes in admissions and average length of stay 
 
 Cumulative effect Average level (a) Cumulative effect as a 
percentage of average 
1985-1989    
Admissions 
 
1 542.36 7 960.5 19.37 
Average Length of Stay 
 
-1.95 8.02 24.31 
1989-1994    
Admissions  
 
833.6 9 866.6 8.44 
Average Length of Stay -1.73 6.98 24.78 
 
Note: (a) Figures in this column are ALOS computed for the sample mean in 1989 and 1994. 
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